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FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AS A RISK ESCALATOR 
A CASE STUDY OF IDEALS AND PRACTICE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Medium/low secure units occupy a central role in forensic mental health care, 
bridging high secure and community services. Although outcomes, assessed 
in terms of readmission and identified reoffending, have been evaluated, little 
research exploring processes underlying attempted rehabilitation for offenders 
diagnosed as having mental health problems has been undertaken. The 
present qualitative study built upon previous research completed in a Northern 
England medium/low secure forensic mental health care institution for adults 
with learning disabilities (Heyman, et al., 2002; Heyman, Buswell-Griffiths and 
Taylor, 2002). It was carried out in a medium/low secure forensic mental 
health care Unit located in London. In phase one, 43 staff, including general 
managers, doctors, nurses, psychologists and occupational therapists were 
interviewed about their philosophy of care, views about risk management for 
forensic mental health patients and perceptions of the Unit. In phase two, 10 
case studies of patients were undertaken. As far as possible, patients were 
interviewed twice over a period of 11-20 months, and staff were asked about 
their progress. Two case conferences were observed. Data were analysed 
using the metaphorical concept of a rehabilitative risk escalator around three 
themes carried forward from the previous study: organisational issues; patient 
active risk management; and multiprofessional collaboration. 
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FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AS A RISK ESCALATOR 
A CASE STUDY OF IDEALS AND PRACTICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the relationship between risk management ideals and 
practice in the complex world of forensic mental heath care. This service 
caters for patients who are deemed to pose a risk to others, and possibly to 
themselves, on account, usually, of a record of serious offences against the 
person, and who are considered to have serious mental health problems. 
They are cared for within a health service framework, but are detained in 
accommodation offering various degrees of security. 
 
The paper employs the concept of the health risk escalator (Heyman and 
Henriksen, 1998, pp. 94-103; Heyman, Griffiths and Taylor, 2002; Heyman, in 
press) in the analysis of themes arising from qualitative research conducted in 
a London-based regional secure unit (RSU). Impediments to the ideal of 
progressive treatment and rehabilitation of patients will be explored through 
consideration of patient and staff perceptions of three issues: organisational 
processes; patients’ attempts to actively manage their own risk status; and 
multiprofessional collaboration. This introduction will briefly consider forensic 
mental health risk management in relation to the wider social science of risk, 
discuss the evolution of RSUs from a risk management perspective, and 
outline the application of the health risk escalator metaphor in this care 
context.  
 4
 
Late Modernity and Risk  
 
Concern with risk management in the field of forensic mental health care is 
underpinned by a wider preoccupation with risk in late-modern industrial 
western societies. The conceptualisation of danger, recognised in all cultures, 
in terms of risk entails a historically novel mode of thought (Douglas, 1994). 
Pervasive  societal adoption of a risk framework is motivated by a desire to 
control the future of real life processes which are too complex to predict other 
than inductively and probabilistically.  
 
The status of this inductive risk framework is heavily contested, both in the 
wider society and in the social scientific literature. It may be viewed as a form 
of progress, replacing understandings of the future based on ideas of fate, 
magic or the will of the gods (Bernstein, 1996). However, its critics consider 
attempted colonisation of the future (Giddens, 1991) as hubristic, a view 
anticipated by Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in the nineteenth century. This 
new way of thinking increases public expectations that adverse events should 
be calculable and preventable, generating anxiety when control proves 
elusive (Beck, 1992). The attention paid to the concept of risk in late-modern 
societies reflects heightened anxiety about controlling the future. Hazards 
arising as side-effects of cumulative technological development appear to 
become ever more numerous, global and damaging, and less controllable and 
predictable. Such concerns compound more traditional fears about the fragility 
of the social order in the face of individuals, now conceptualised as mentally 
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disordered offenders, whose personal deviance cannot be framed in terms of 
culturally recognised motivations such as wealth accumulation.  
 
In conditions of real life complexity, the natural science approach has to rely 
on inductive inference from averaged trends. In the field of forensic mental 
health care, this approach, discussed by Mcguire in the present volume, is 
epitomised by the actuarial approach to assessment of the risk of released 
patients re-offending (Monahan et al., 2001). The actuarial approach aims to 
improve predictive accuracy by replacing clinical judgements about individual 
cases with empirically based inductive inferences about populations. Even 
Monahan et al., who have some faith in the power of multivariate models, 
accept that, ‘at best, predictions will involve approximations of the degree of 
risk presented by a person, presented as a range rather than a single number, 
with recognition that not every person thus classified, even one accurately 
determined to be in a high risk group, will commit a violent act’ (Monahan et 
al., 2001, p. 143).  The quotation is tautological since, by definition, high risk 
(as against certain) events will frequently not occur. It also  raises the 
question of where the dividing line between high and low risk should be set.  
 
As Mullen has commented, ‘the language of dangerousness has been 
transmuted into the language of risk which has the comforting resonance of 
the actuarial, the calculable and the avoidable’ (Mullen, 2002, p.9), averaging 
the mystery of individual intentions into collective frequencies. Notoriously, 
actuarially based screening techniques generate high proportions of false 
positives and poor positive predictive values (the ratio of correctly identified to  
Formatted
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higher risk cases), particularly for relatively unusual events (Gigerenzer, 2002) 
such as serious re-offending. (More accurately, false positives should be 
described as cases identified as higher risk which don’t exhibit the index 
attribute. Inductively derived probabilities are applied to individual cases but 
can only be falsified in collectivities since an individual higher risk event may 
not occur, as noted above.)  
 
Even the identification, let alone the prediction, of adverse events such as 
reoffending is notoriously difficult. To mention just one difficulty, those who 
reoffend but are not caught will not be included as positive cases in the 
databases from which models are induced. Of most relevance to the present 
paper, the implications of actuarial analysis for clinical rehabilitation are 
problematic. Identification as risk markers of unalterable attributes such as 
gender, age and childhood experience and offending history, and of dynamic 
but difficult to modify factors such as social isolation and use of illegal 
substances, work against the mission of safely rehabilitating offenders. In 
order to exit from their actuarially higher risk status, forensic mental health 
service users have to somehow compensate for these fixed or intractable 
indicators.  
 
Risk Management in a Regional Secure Unit 
 
The medium/low secure mental health unit in which the research discussed in 
this paper was carried out (the Unit) was established in 1996 in the context of 
Government policies which sought to move policy away from prolonged 
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detention of mental health patients in large asylums towards their care in the 
community. This shift, which began in the 1960s, did not wholly embrace 
mentally disordered offenders (Jewsbury and McCulloch, 2002). The Butler 
Report (Home Office and DHSS 1975) recommended a stepped approach to 
the release of high security patients and the establishment of regional secure 
units (RSUs) (DoH 2000), subsequently often referred to as medium secure 
units. The former term will be used in this paper because most such units 
contain accommodation offering a range of security levels, the calibration of 
which is not necessarily consistent between institutions. 
 
RSUs were initially intended to provide a total of 1,000 places, a target which 
was eventually exceeded. By 1998, they contained over 3000 places, usually 
offering a mix of provision graded in terms of medium/low security, and hence 
psychosocial distance from the outside community. Acceleration in their 
development was associated with the Reed Report (DoH and Home Office, 
1992), an extensive review of services for mentally disordered offenders. The 
report recommended a continuing commitment to community care, 
underpinned by strengthened interagency co-operation and multidisciplinary 
team working. RSUs aim to provide a progression between total confinement 
and gradually increasing freedom for patients as they move towards 
rehabilitation, a process potentially aided by their proximity to local 
communities and any sources of family support. The special hospitals remain, 
with only a modest decrease in numbers, from 1,700 in 1992 to 1,300 in 1998 
(DoH, 1999), alongside the increasing numbers in RSUs, more of whom are 
becoming long-stay patients.  
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Hence, the main historical pattern over the last 15 years, in the UK at least, 
has been of forensic mental health service expansion rather than the 
substitution of low/medium for high security provision. The theme of risk 
assessment and control has assumed a pivotal role in these services, partly in 
response to Government fear that ‘care in the community’ has failed to ensure 
public safety (DoH, 1998; 1999; 2001), a concern driven by media-fuelled 
public anxiety about the threat posed by mentally disordered offenders 
(Laurance, 2003). This discourse of risk assessment tends, in clinical practice, 
to be about such people rather than with them, despite their status as patients 
(Langan and Lindow, 2004). 
 
The RSU as a Health Risk Escalator 
 
Some medically oriented research has assessed clinically defined need 
and/or outcomes for RSU users (Baxter, Rabe-Hesketh and Parrott, 1999; 
Friendship et al., 1999; Coid et al., 2001; Ricketts et al., 2001; Edwards, 
Steed and Murray, 2002; Heap, 2003). Few studies of the attempted 
rehabilitation process in RSUs have been undertaken. The present qualitative 
study explores this process in its organisational context, drawing upon the 
metaphor of the rehabilitative risk escalator. 
 
A health risk escalator has been defined as ‘a system, designed or emergent, 
which is oriented towards managing a defined health risk, and which is made 
up of a set of sub-systems, ordered in terms of different trade-offs between 
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autonomy and safety, through which service users may move’ (Heyman, in 
press). To operate as a risk escalator, a health care system must be seen to 
possess three qualities: differentiation of steps in treatment regime in terms of 
the degrees of risk severity they are designed to manage; attempted 
congruence between varying levels of safety/autonomy balance and assessed 
client riskiness; and the potential to move individuals up towards increased 
safety (for self and/or others) and down towards greater autonomy. These 
features are not meant to be read as objective features of a risk escalator, but 
rather to draw attention to a tacit, shared view of complex risk management 
social systems predicated on complex, unarticulated judgemental processes.   
 
The risk escalator concept can be applied to a wide range of health care risk 
management systems, e.g. the system of screening, diagnostic testing and 
pregnancy termination designed to reduce the risk of babies being born with 
chromosomal abnormalities (Heyman and Henriksen, 2001). This system 
provides an example of an ‘upwards’ risk escalator, as the initial stage, serum 
and other forms of screening, identifies a higher risk sub-group who are 
offered a more intense procedure, diagnostic testing which may lead to the 
offer of a termination at the next level if fetal chromosomal abnormalities are 
identified. Upwards risk escalators are susceptible to iatrogenic positive 
feedback, as the identification of risks trigger procedures which themselves 
carry risks. For example, miscarriages can be caused by amniocentesis 
administered to women who are not carrying a baby with chromosomal 
abnormalities but screened positive, i.e. as being at higher risk, via less 
accurate but non-invasive testing.  
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The concept can readily be applied to rehabilitation through an RSU, a 
‘downward’ risk escalator which aims to gradually progress patients from 
safety towards autonomy in relatively small, easy stages. Patients who learn 
how to cope successfully with a small amount of autonomy are offered a little 
more until, eventually, their presumed riskiness is reduced to levels low 
enough to make discharge an acceptable risk. Given the nebulousness of risk 
status assessments, particularly in the field of forensic mental health care, 
downwards risk escalators are susceptible to charges both of unwarranted 
therapeutic optimism and unnecessary conservatism. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Heyman and Henriksen (1998, pp. 94-103) and Heyman (in 
press). A diagrammatic representation of the Unit, which was continually 
reorganising during the data collection period, at one point in time as a risk 
escalator is provided in Figure One below. 
 
Insert Figure One here. 
 
The quotations presented as data will be mapped onto the structure 
represented in Figure One. The small within-unit steps displayed in this figure 
were not formally recognised in the Unit. However, some staff perceived these 
small differences in the autonomy/safety balance as corresponding to a 
matching calibration of (presumed) riskiness. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
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The present study was modelled on previous research completed in a 
medium/low secure forensic mental health facility for adults with learning 
disabilities (Heyman, Buswell-Griffiths and Taylor, 2002). The Unit, located in 
a deprived inner-city area of London, provides care for about 100 patients, 
around 90% male, and has a large proportion of individuals from diverse 
ethnic minorities amongst its patients and junior nursing staff. The largest, 
non-majority groups, both among nurses and patients, are of black African 
and Caribbean origin. The study was designed in two phases, with fieldwork 
undertaken between 2000 and 2003. In the first phase, 43 staff interviews, 
with general managers (2), qualified (19) and unqualified (7) nurses, 
psychologists (3), occupational therapists (3), social workers (3) and doctors 
(6), were carried out in order to explore staff views about the Unit, and to 
guide directions of enquiry for a second phase. The sample included 11 
senior managers, who worked across ward-based and community services, 
with at least one at this level from each profession. Three nurse respondents 
were entirely community-based. 
 
Managers and medical staff all consented to be interviewed, apart from one 
consultant doctor who declined on account of pressure of work. Front-line 
staff were recruited through requests to volunteer. They were therefore self-
selected. Nurses on one ward expressed suspicion about the purpose of the 
project and declined to become involved in the phase one interviews, 
although one of these nurses agreed to participate in a case study. The 
sample provided a range of views about the RSU, as will be seen below, but 
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these opinions were not intended to be, and were not, necessarily 
representative of RSU staff views. 
 
The second study phase involved intensive case studies with 10 patients. 
Case studies included, at most, two interviews with each patient, with the 
second undertaken after 11-20 months, interviews with the staff involved in 
their individual care, and observation of case conferences. Patients at 
different RSU locations were identified in discussion with ward managers and 
invited to participate. Four selected patients over and above the 10 mentioned 
above were not included, two because they declined, one on account of 
concerns that participation might interfere with therapy, and one because he 
was judged too dangerous to be interviewed privately. After their first 
interview, patient respondents were asked if the interviewers could speak to 
their professional carers, attend a case conference and revisit them later. One 
case study patient did not want any staff interviews, and another consented 
only to a nurse manager being interviewed for the case study. One member of 
staff refused to participate in case studies. Sixteen staff were interviewed, 
providing staff views for nine of the 10 case studies. Two case conferences 
have been attended and recorded, and five patients have been revisited for a 
progress update. Of the other five patients, four were discharged during the 
study period and one died. As with staff interviews, the case study 
respondents offer a range of trajectories and views, but do not necessarily 
represent those of the overall RSU patient population.  
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Lightly structured phase one staff interviews were organised around the 
following topics: the aims of the Unit and their own role; what works well and 
barriers to the delivery of high quality care; issues arising from patients’ 
movements through the wards; accounts about anonymous patients who had 
progressed well or not progressed well through the system; and formal and 
informal risk assessment processes. Data collected in phase one informed the 
topics covered in phase two. In phase two interviews, patients were asked 
about the following issues: how they were getting on; what moves they had 
made backwards or forwards through the wards, and how the moves had 
come about; how they spent their time; what they considered good and not 
good about their care; how they viewed their future; and what risks were 
reduced or increased by their residence at the Unit.  
 
Interviews, undertaken by three of the authors of this paper, and case 
conferences were taped and fully transcribed for analysis around thematic 
categories. They are quoted verbatim, with respondents identified through 
pseudonyms. Information which might identify an individual has been 
removed. Frequent visits and informal contacts with Trust staff allowed the 
researchers to absorb some of the cultural milieu of the Unit. Seven 
presentations to Trust staff have been held, generating discussions which 
have yielded further insights into perceptions of care and multidisciplinary 
working in the Unit. The research was approved by the NHS Local Research 
Ethics Committee. Participants received a printed information sheet and 
consent form. 
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Interview and case study transcripts were coded thematically. Coding was 
undertaken concurrently with data collection, so that subsequent interviews 
could explore emergent themes. Data interpretations were checked through 
frequent discussion of independent analyses of the same transcript carried 
out by members of the research team. Feedback arising from presentations to 
Trust staff provided another method of checking thematic interpretations. 
However, their credibility depends primarily on the reader’s judgements about 
the analysis of qualitative data presented directly in the paper.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Qualitative data, drawn primarily from interviews with staff and patients, will be 
used to highlight critical issues associated with the operation of the Unit as a 
downwards risk escalator. The researchers were only able to observe the 
system in operation to a limited degree. Nevertheless, comparisons of 
comments made by staff and patient respondents at different locations within 
the organisation allowed the ideal-typical representations of risk management 
to be related to emergent problems. The ideal-typical will be reviewed in terms 
of three issues, organisational processes, patient perspectives on risk 
management and multiprofessional collaboration.  
 
The Ideal-Typical Risk Escalator 
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The two quotations given below, provided respectively by a senior manager 
and doctor, illustrate ideal-typical perspectives on the potential for risk 
reduction and rehabilitation in forensic mental health services.  
 
The current proposal of a medium secure service is that we should take 
someone who has committed an offence whilst they have been unwell, 
and bring them in here and be able to, it could be that it is homicide, but 
bring them in here, and be able to put them back in the community 
somewhere around 18 months to two years … [The RSU] provides a 
step-down unit for high secure hospitals, and we provide a sort of step-
up service from local secure PICUs. [Psychiatric Intensive Care Units] 
…, and those hard to manage patients who are in, say, generic 
psychiatry. (Graham, RSU general manager, phase one interview) 
 
This manager’s therapeutic optimism may have been associated with him 
having recently joined the Unit at the time of the interview. He left the Unit 
about two years later to take up another post. The quotation locates the Unit 
in an elongated health risk escalator, as a sub-unit within a larger multi-
organisational system, the whole representing a stepped progression in care 
offering different autonomy/safety balances. Additionally, the quotation 
radically uncouples the length of stay in secure units from considerations of 
retribution and criminal justice. From a risk management perspective, as this 
respondent argues, offenders whose crimes were caused by a mental health 
condition shed their high-risk status if they are cured, and should, therefore, 
be released. The respondent illustrated the point with the hypothetical 
Formatted
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example of a patient who murdered his mother in response to the specific 
delusion that she was trying to kill him. If the delusion could be cleared up 
through the use of psycho-pharmaceuticals, the patient would no longer have 
high risk status, and could be released. Although the short time rehabilitation 
period cited reflects standard policy positions (Snowden, 1990; Reed, 1997), 
the point at issue is not the time frame but a perspective which prioritises risks 
arising from mental health problems rather than criminality or justice.  
 
The next quotation offers an ideal-typical account of a multi-faceted 
rehabilitation process. 
 
I think medication is very important … There was one patient who killed 
his dad. And he was so psychotic, and he was medicated, and he was 
no longer psychotic. But then he got depressed … and psychology was 
very important to help [him] see what he has done, and come to terms 
with what he had done ... I think occupational therapy is very important 
for lots of people …  cooking skills, health care, trips to the community. 
And social work … accommodation and benefits. (Neelam, MSU senior 
house officer (SHO), phase one interview) 
 
SHOs were younger, non-specialist doctors working on rotation. The view of 
rehabilitation  expressed above suggests a progression of qualitative phase 
shifts in each of which a particular profession would play a lead role on 
account of its specialist knowledge base. The process starts with physical 
treatment of a disease, works through psychological issues, takes up daily 
Formatted
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living skills and finishes with the establishment of links to the outside 
community. Nursing is noticeably absent from this list, however, even though 
nurses make up by far the largest segment of the workforce in the Unit, and 
patients spend a much higher proportion of their time with them than with 
other professional groups. The diffuse, holistic and integrative role of nursing 
in this ideal-typical account of rehabilitation, perhaps, cannot be so easily 
defined by doctors whose interactions with them may be rather limited. 
 
Organisational Processes 
 
Rehabilitation was delivered by a complex organisational structure which 
included multiple professions who needed to collaborate, wards within the 
Unit, the NHS Trust of which the Unit was part and interfaces with external 
service providers. The effective operation of the Unit as a downwards risk 
escalator could be undermined by disjunctions between any of these 
elements.  
 
The analysis presented below will focus on accounts of the Unit’s operation 
obtained in research interviews. Involvement with the Unit generated a wealth 
of additional information which did not register in interviews or observations of 
case conferences. The Unit was affected by rapid staff turnover and 
shortages, reliance on agency employees, staff ethnic affiliations and 
divisions, repeated serious untoward incidents, defective patient safety 
systems, a blame culture, accusations and rumours about professional 
misconduct, frequent removals of staff deemed to have failed and 
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interprofessional rivalries. However, our analysis of organisational processes 
will focus not on these serious surface manifestations of social disarray, but 
on underlying tensions within the architecture of the rehabilitative risk 
escalator. These tensions interacted with, but also fuelled, conflict within the 
Unit and between the Unit and other agencies. Their main effect was to open 
up disjunctions between a patient’s perceived risk status and their closeness 
to discharge. 
 
Unlike many physical escalators, the metaphorical risk escalator contained 
multiple entry and exit points, an architecture which complicated the 
management of individual patient trajectories. 
 
In theory, you know, we can take people from the community who have 
come in on a section three [of the Mental Health Act, allowing 
compulsory preventative detention for the protection of the patient or 
others in some circumstances], or we can take people from special 
hospitals, and we can take people back from other regional secure units 
or medium secure units. And so there’s several different routes. They 
don’t necessarily have to come through the admission wards either. They 
can go straight to the continuing assessment support ward, or they 
could, in theory, go straight to the rehab wards, so only the most 
disturbed people would come here. (Martin, ITU manager [nurse], phase 
one interview) 
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This respondent had recently been moved from a rehabilitation ward to the 
ITU, a move about which he expressed considerable unhappiness in informal 
conversations. He also criticised the Unit quite severely, for example for poor 
ward design. Shortly after the interview, he was asked to relocate to a remote 
community team. The term ‘in theory’, repeated twice, conveys his distanced 
stance from the Unit regime. The relatively mild comments quoted suggest 
that the existence of multiple entry and exit points complicates the 
achievement of congruence between the assessed riskiness of patients and 
the autonomy/safety balance.  
 
Problems occurred if patients judged too difficult to manage in a medium 
secure facility were admitted for financial reasons. 
 
Because of the overspend, we have to bring back people who are much 
more ill, and I think that has really contaminated some people’s rehab 
problem. (Norman, RSU nurse manager, phase one interview) 
 
The overspend refers to the Trust’s financial deficit which was partly offset by 
obtaining revenues for extra-contractual patients whose illness severity 
adversely affected the rehabilitation of others. The quotation illustrates the 
tension, discussed further below, between a risk management framework 
focussed on the rehabilitation of individuals and the requirement to care for 
patients in groups. At the other end of the risk continuum, the Home Office 
could be viewed as excessively cautious, perhaps held back by the mass 
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media fuelled political imperative to avoid any serious untoward incidents 
involving discharged forensic mental health patients.  
 
Sometimes these consultants send off the team [report] very quickly, 
right, requesting the leave and an update, blah blah, but the Home 
Office, tends sometimes to drag their feet on these things. So it is not 
always the fault of the [consultants]. (Craig, LSU staff nurse, phase one 
interview) 
 
At the time of the interview, the LSU had just been built, and smelled of new 
paint. It’s garden had not (and still has not) been completed. Patients who 
change medical officer have to reapply for leave entitlement, as had 
happened to all those on this new ward. The temporary suspension of leave 
and the lack of a location for outside exercise may have exacerbated patients’ 
claustrophobia, making Home Office delays even more frustrating than they 
might otherwise have been. 
 
The following instructive quotation illustrates an organisational response to 
the underlying risk management dilemma of balancing autonomy with safety. 
 
We have too many stages. So you have an intensive care [ward] … 
Then, from intensive care, they [patients] go into admission ward, and 
they spend another period in the admission ward, and sometimes it is too 
long. From the admission ward they go to the first of the rehabilitation 
wards, as you say, and I am not sure how focussed they are in terms of 
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rehabilitation. And, from there, they go to another form of rehabilitation 
ward, which is, could be said to be, a form of pre-discharge ward. And 
they send them to the pre-discharge for a period. And then, somehow, 
some of the patients are transferred … to a further pre-discharge ward 
which is outside this unit … before going into the community. But now we 
have opened a low secure service, because of the sensitivity, and, I 
think, people’s anxieties. They feel, ‘Well, I’m still not sure. I can transfer 
them to this one’. (Graham, RSU general manager, phase one interview) 
 
The decision to discharge, or recommend discharge of, a patient required 
clinicians to make a critical judgement about the safety/autonomy balance. 
Detaining a patient might unnecessarily, and expensively, curtail their 
autonomy. Releasing them might result in re-offending for which the risk 
manager would be held responsible. The above respondent suggests that 
managers postponed these difficult decisions by elongating the risk escalator, 
adding further rehabilitation stages. This elongation would simply push back 
the critical decision about when, if ever, to release a patient. 
 
A second tension was observed between individual progression and group 
care. Although the risk escalator metaphor focuses on the risk status of 
individual patients, they were cared for en masse. This contradiction 
generated a tension between moving a patient up or down the risk escalator 
according to their risk status and managing the Unit as a collectivity. A lack of 
spare capacity, arising both from high demand for beds and financially driven 
pressure to fill them, entangled patients in chains of movement. Patients could 
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not move down or up the system unless an appropriate place was vacated 
which, in turn, required more spaces to become available further up or down 
the system.  
 
Well there’s the decision process about the patient and there’s also 
decisions are made on the basis of where spaces are sometimes. 
(Pamela, RSU psychologist, phase one interview) 
 
Psychologists belong to the multidisciplinary teams which make 
recommendations about patient progress, but are not involved in ward or bed 
management. Decisions which they have been party to may be overruled by 
the bed management team which is made up of doctors and nurses only. 
Blockages occurred frequently in relation to discharge, which required the 
provision of suitable accommodation by external agencies. 
 
I want to be free. I have been doing self-catering for three years. I am not 
a danger to myself. I am not a danger to anyone. I’m not getting my 
accommodation. They are not getting me anything. (Daniel, patient in 
CASU who is eager to be discharged, case study interview) 
 
Daniel cited his accomplishment of self-catering as evidence of his low risk 
status. This association may derive from the model of rehabilitation articulated 
by the Senior House Officer quoted above, in which medical, psychological 
and then daily living skills are progressively dealt with. Incongruence between 
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his self-defined risk status and his position on the risk escalator (in our terms) 
delegitmated the health care regime for Daniel.  
 
Lack of control over patient admissions and discharges resulted in staff 
having to manage patients with widely different needs within the same ward.  
 
The [ITU] ward is more like, half of it is more like, a rehab ward. They 
have three patients there that are waiting to go off to special hospitals 
and are blocking beds. They have four patients that need acute care, 
need intensive care. So, because they have three bed-blockers, that 
turns some of our beds into very acute care beds, not through choice but 
through necessity. (Beverley, MSU admission and assessment ward 
manager [nurse], phase one interview) 
 
The above respondent had resigned at the time of the interview, having been 
criticised for attempting to send  difficult cases back to ITU where care was 
more expensive. She suggests in the quotation that blockages distorted the 
care system, in this case requiring staff to manage rehabilitation and acute 
care within the same ward environment. Conversely, movements motivated 
by inter-individual considerations could cause comparable distortions. 
 
Interviewer: What happened that meant that you moved? 
Patient: Well I had a fight with a patient over there. Another patient on 
the ward was fighting. 
Interviewer: Oh right. So it was about splitting you up? 
Deleted: Beverley, manager of 
a medium secure admissions 
ward, phase one interview)
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Patient: Yeah. Well not only that. It was progress. It was the [only] 
progress I’d made since I’d been on that ward. (Ian, patient in 
rehabilitation ward (MSU) who had been cycled between less and more 
secure accommodation several times, phase two interview) 
 
This patient had been confined in secure mental health services for many 
years, perhaps as a result of his belligerent attitude rather than the severity of 
his original offending. He had progressed as far as a pre-release ward, but 
had broken the terms set by the parole board for his release. His possibly 
ironic reference to ‘progress’, in our terms down the risk escalator into a ward 
closer to the community exit, had been undertaken in order to prevent him 
and another patient from fighting. This example clearly illustrates the tension 
between caring for groups of patients and generating individual trajectories 
based on risk assessment. 
 
Organisationally derived blockages and movements which weakened the 
congruence between patients’ risk status and their position on the risk 
escalator weakened the Unit’s therapeutic legitimacy.  
 
I think sometimes patients here are very frustrated … We get all sort of 
grades of patients. Some would see themselves as, you know, ‘My index 
offence is less than yours, so why am I still being stuck here?’ … We 
can’t move people due to the pressure of the service. (Norman, RSU 
nurse manager, phase one interview) 
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Patients assessed their risk status, and therefore the appropriateness of their 
position, in various ways. For example, one patient compared his dose of 200 
mills of Haliparidol with that of a patient peer on 300 mills, concluding that he 
was less ill, and should, therefore, be allowed to move on. The patient quoted 
below justified his rapid progress by comparing his relatively low drug dose 
with those received by other patients. 
 
Interviewer: So your progress through some of the wards has been very 
quick, and the progress, the speed of others has been slower. What do 
you think the difference is between – 
Patient: Because their illness is greater than mine … because my illness 
is treated by three milligram of Respiridon. It is a very low dose … So my 
illness is controllable easily. (Hassan, patient in rehabilitation ward 
(MSU) who had progressed quickly towards rehabilitation in comparison 
with other patients, case study interview) 
 
This quotation in a forensic mental health care context implicitly conflates 
mental health, as indexed by drug dose, with risk status. However, this 
patient’s lower drug prescription may have been associated with him not 
posing ward management problems. At the time of the interview, staff were 
questioning whether Hassan could be safely discharged. 
 
Blockages leading to perceived incongruence between risk status and 
position on the rehabilitative risk escalator could generate a vicious circle, 
fuelled by positive feedback, whereby a patient’s failure to move on caused 
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them to react to the resulting frustration in ways which reinforced their higher 
risk status. 
 
It confines and spirals a patient out to be on a high security ward for too 
long. It’s too confining and probably … causes more difficulties of 
rebellion and pushing against the structure. (Patrick, MSU social worker, 
phase one interview) 
 
In order to avoid this vicious circle and consequent delays, patients had to 
exercise extraordinary patience. 
 
Interviewer: Have things changed the way you want them to have 
done? Are they going as you would have liked? 
Patient: Yeah … Couldn’t go any better really. 
Interviewer: Is there anything that you would have liked to have done 
different? 
Patient: Well, … the length of time really. If it had been quicker, it would 
have been better. And that is the way it goes, you know? Just got to sit 
back and be patient, you know. (Stan, patient in a rehabilitation ward 
who has lived in secure institutions for over 15 years, and has 
progressed steadily towards rehabilitation in the last few years, phase 
two interviews) 
 
Staff viewed this patient with suspicion, in part because of his overwhelming 
compliance and positiveness about the Unit. They had given him the 
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sobriquet of ‘The Star Patient’. This theme, that patients might earn, or at 
least attempt to earn, rehabilitation by temporarily accepting a compliant role 
will be considered further in the next section. 
 
Patient movements, whether linked to an individualised risk assessment or 
not, could disrupt established relationships.  
 
I mean, it’s sad moving home. In fact, it [changing ward] is moving home, 
which is the most stressful thing in life. And, of course, once they move, 
there is no real way to contact their friends or staff … That’s why I think 
more effort should be made for the care patients get to be changed. It 
seems to be done very haphazardly … Sometimes, somebody will be 
told, ‘Oh, you have to move in a matter of a couple of days’. (Bella, 
nursing assistant, MSU admission and assessment ward, phase one 
interview) 
 
This issue can also be analysed in terms of the tension between 
individualised patient rehabilitation trajectories and care en masse. Patients 
undertake solo journeys towards rehabilitation, but live in communities from 
which they can build up social support networks. Junior nurses like the above 
respondent who interacted more frequently with individual patients may be 
more aware of the personal cost of relocation than are their seniors who 
decide patient movements. 
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Patient Self-management of Their Risk Status 
 
Models of risk assessment, whether actuarial or clinical, tend to discount 
reflexivity. Patients are treated as judgemental dopes whose behaviour 
reveals their underlying risk status diagnostically. However, risk assessment 
impacts significantly on their life prospects. In particular, being assigned to a 
lower risk status makes an earlier release more likely. The following quotation 
illustrates a patient’s awareness of the information game involved in risk 
assessment-based rehabilitation. 
 
I mean, I was here, and I played the game the right way. That’s to keep 
quiet and wait, you know, to get better. (Tom, CASU patient who has 
lived in secure institutions for over 20 years, phase two interviews) 
 
Tom had previously resided in prison, high security and private units for over 
two decades. His account conflates information game playing with improved 
mental health. As the former, if it works, generates a change towards lower 
risk social status, this conflation was reinforced by the operation of the 
rehabilitative risk escalator. Moreover, to the extent that mental disorder is a 
social status rather than a personal condition, better mental health, and 
therefore reduced risk status in a forensic context, may become self-
validating. The following quotation, similarly, adopts a grudgingly accepting 
but challenging stance towards the conflation of rehabilitation with learning to 
conform. 
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Patients get worn down really, not really being cared for. But you’re 
beating your head against the wall so many times, so you just accept 
what’s going on. It’s not really that you become all that better. You’ve just 
accepted what’s going on … I think it’s just a case of getting used to the 
environment, or the rules and regulations. (Kunle, charge nurse, CASU, 
phase one interview) 
 
The above respondent differentiated the achievement of mental health from 
becoming accustomed to rules and regulations. He cited this gap as evidence 
for an institutional failure of care.  
 
The systematic rewarding of patient conformity confounded risk assessment 
which, for patients who sought to be discharged as quickly as possible, could 
become an element in an information game. Staff attempted to peer 
underneath this lower risk surface by observing patients in testing situations, 
itself a risky procedure. 
 
Nurse: I personally think, when he goes out [on leave], that’s a big test 
for him, because he goes out on a Saturday to [large town], and [town] is 
quite far, and anything can happen then … If something really pushed 
him, he would do something … 
Interviewer: … What plans do you have in place for the future for Stan? 
…  
Nurse: … I think he is going to be here for a long time. (Letitia, primary 
nurse for MSU rehabilitation ward patient Stan, phase two interview) 
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This patient had been given a life sentence. He was currently allowed out 
during the day, but had to return to secure accommodation at night. The 
notion of a ‘test’ suggests that leave was used to give patients opportunities to 
transgress, hopefully in relatively minor ways, so that a more ecologically valid 
assessment of riskiness could be made. His psychologist was concerned that 
Stan was suppressing anger, and that the managed environment of a secure 
unit provided little scope to test his self-control. He had responded fairly 
calmly to the termination of a close relationship, but the psychologist did not 
feel that this reaction provided a sufficient test of his riskiness. The nurse 
respondent expressed a lack of confidence in the test procedure outlined 
above, perhaps on account of its obvious flaws: first, that patients might 
conceal their riskiness temporarily, whilst on leave; and, secondly, that they 
might commit a serious offence. However, there is no obvious escape from 
this risk assessment dilemma. The measures which make an RSU a safe 
environment also obscure patient riskiness. The respondent, in response to 
an interviewer query, checked with a more senior nurse, and found to her 
surprise that Stan was marked for eventual release. This incident illustrates 
how a patient’s rehabilitative prospects could become ill-defined through 
being calibrated both amnestically, in terms of their past offending history, and 
through complex judgements about their present underlying risk status. 
 
Instead of conforming in order to speed their release, patients might act, 
consciously or not, in ways which prevented them from moving down the risk 
escalator towards release. 
 31
 
One has been here six years. The other person has been here three 
years, I think, um, and both have moved towards discharge, and … 
something has happened, you know. They have become unwell. They, 
um, harmed themselves or something. And I think that is when it is often 
about the anxiety. But, of course, the longer people stay, the more 
anxiety they often are going to have about then going into leaving, 
because it becomes a little world on it’s own here. (Sylvia, MSU 
psychologist, phase one interview) 
 
Staff recognised the phenomenon of ‘gate fever’. Gate fever could create its 
own vicious circle if patients managed their anxiety about re-entry to the 
outside world by adopting delaying tactics which led to further delays, 
increasing their anxiety still further. This phenomenon posed a challenge for 
risk management which was not always taken into account because 
previously compliant patients could suddenly become unsafe. This 
psychologist’s sense of the Unit as a ‘little world ’ may be associated with her 
being new to her post at the time of the interview, and seeing herself as an 
outsider. She felt that Unit staff were organisationally risk-blind to gate fever 
and to other issues linked to offending, for example to the aetiological 
significance of illegal drugs and alcohol use which were not systematically 
addressed in the Unit. 
 
As well as arising from institutionalisation, gate fever could be associated with 
patient concerns about their external circumstances. 
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Boyd became acutely agoraphobic. Even if we wanted to, we wouldn’t 
have got him out of the front door because, as far as he was concerned, 
he had been on the six o’clock news. And, you know, there were wanted 
posters of him up all over [local borough]. That actually felt quite 
genuine. (Jim, CASU psychologist, case conference) 
 
Boyd had asked at his annual review for his case not to be taken to the Home 
Office Tribunal, and that he should become a long stay patient. The above 
quotation documents the negative impact of media selective attention on 
rehabilitation. This account demonstrates that resistance to discharge could 
arise in response to external ecological conditions as well as from the 
psychosocial process of institutionalisation. 
 
Finally, some patients were determined to get themselves readmitted to 
prison so that they could escape from an indeterminate sentence, and also, 
possibly, from being located in a framework of psychiatry and mental health 
care. 
 
There was a patient on the ITU who was insisting on being sent back to 
prison. He didn’t want to stay here, and he actually told the team that he 
faked all his mental illness, you know. According to us, he had heard 
voices. He told the doctors when he was assessed that he was hearing 
voices, and, you know, he … [ended up] assaulting a medic seriously. 
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He was sent back to prison. (Adam, MSU admission and assessment 
ward manager [nurse], phase one interview) 
 
Patients reflect on their risk assessment and attempt to actively manage their 
risk status. They may deliberately act in ways designed to move them into a 
lower or higher risk category or to move in or out of the status of mental health 
patient.  
 
MULTIPROFESSIONAL COLLABORATION 
 
As illustrated by the quotation from a Senior House Officer quoted towards the 
beginning of the Data Analysis section, the successful operation of the 
rehabilitative risk escalator presumed that effective multiprofessional 
collaboration could be accomplished. This section presents a brief pen portrait 
of multidisciplinary working in the Unit. Organisational issues associated with 
the multiprofessional context will then be illustrated in relation to the operation 
of the Unit as a rehabilitative risk escalator. 
 
Patients received services from doctors, psychologists, qualified and 
unqualified nurses, occupational and art therapists, social workers and 
teachers. These differently sized groups participated in multidisciplinary case 
conferences which reviewed patients’ risk status, location within the system 
and discharge prospects. Numerous tensions existed between professions 
which viewed care and rehabilitation differently. For example, nurses 
sometimes expressed a lack of sympathy towards doctors who were 
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assaulted because they considered that doctors could be arrogantly risk-blind 
about their own personal safety. In turn, other professions sometimes 
criticised nurses for being overly concerned with custodial issues. 
 
Each profession had its own internal reporting system which cut across Trust 
boundaries, complicating multiprofessional collaboration. For example, nurses 
reported ultimately to the Trust level Director of Nursing Services for whom 
the Unit represented only one portfolio element. The Director expressed 
frequent concerns about nursing professional standards. She considered that 
nurses’ poor risk management led to frequent failures to prevent serious 
untoward incidents. Constant organisational and personnel change 
complicated multiprofessional collaboration, since, as illustrated below, staff 
struggled to reorient themselves to shifts which occurred outside the world of 
their own professional group.  
 
Nurses provided most day to day contact with patients, whilst the other 
professions offered intermittent contact through maintaining caseloads. 
However, as generally happens in this treatment context, frontline nurses who 
interact most frequently with patients have a relatively low organisational 
status. This was seen in the two case conferences which the researchers 
observed. A nurse was invited to introduce the case, but made little further 
contribution to the discussion. Nurses sometimes felt that their judgement 
about the riskiness of patients were discounted even though they were based 
on directly obtained holistic knowledge of individuals rather than intermittent 
scanning of a caseload.  At the same time, some considered that their 
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frontline role made them vulnerable to scapegoating when adverse events 
occurred.  This issue raises the question of acceptable risk versus negligence, 
almost invariably posed in retrospect after an adverse event had occurred, 
and mostly directed at nurses on account of their daily caring role. 
 
The social worker cited below put effective multiprofessional collaboration at 
the centre of effective working of, in our terms, the rehabilitative risk escalator. 
 
I think, for me, you can’t beat a stable multidisciplinary team … 
professionals from various backgrounds, nursing, education, therapy, 
psychology, all coming from different viewpoints. And if there’s honesty 
and respect there, there’s the ability to challenge … I think that’s the 
baseline within the Unit. (Patrick, MSU social worker, phase one 
interview) 
 
Patrick had resigned from the Unit because his workload, which had been 
increased to include more community placements as well as an MSU 
caseload, had become, in his view, too difficult to manage. The reference to 
‘honesty and respect’ raises the question of collective relationships between 
professional groupings which differ in status, remuneration and social power, 
each with its own variant on the wider cultural world view. Systematic analysis 
of this complex issue goes beyond the scope of the present paper. In relation 
to analysing the operation of the Unit as a risk escalator, it is sufficient to note 
that achievement of multiprofessional collaboration was problematic, and, at 
best, fragile.  
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Probably, what is lacking is the lack of communication among disciplines 
… I would appreciate if there was some more feedback being given after, 
as soon as the [therapy] session is finished … So, that would probably, 
you know, would help in evaluating the overall care of the patient. 
(Frederico, MSU rehabilitation ward staff nurse, phase one interview) 
 
Constant staff changes at all levels, fuelled by regional labour shortages and 
purges, made the always delicate task of attaining multiprofessional 
collaboration even more problematic. 
 
Management here is like a tide. It comes and goes out, and we have 
almost three-monthly tides that are management changes … Since I 
have been here, I have had five different managers in two years, yeah. 
And I have had five different views, and five different opinions which I 
have to implement. So, when there is inconsistency with the 
management, there is inconsistency with the approaches that we will 
use. (Beverley, MSU admission and assessment ward manager [nurse], 
phase one interview) 
 
As noted above, Beverley was herself part of the management ‘tide’. This 
interview took place just before she left the Unit to take up another post 
following a reorganisation. She had been criticised, and felt that her position on 
the Unit was vulnerable. The next quotation articulates the inhibitory impact of 
endless staff changes on multiprofessional collaboration. 
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MDT [multidisciplinary team working] has been difficult. There have been 
a lot of staff changes, and there has been a lot of instability within teams. 
And that’s, I think, one of the reasons why it has been very difficult 
developing a philosophy of care and way of working (Richard, CASU 
psychologist, phase one interview) 
 
Richard, who was part of a new multidisciplinary team at the time of the 
interview, left the Unit shortly afterwards, disillusioned on account of the 
problems he refers to. The wider blame culture in which forensic mental health 
services currently have to operate could generate a condemnatory atmosphere 
between professional groups, encouraging a procedure-bound approach, and 
inhibiting risk-taking.  
 
The protocols and everything are quite rigid, and there is also the blame 
culture. The nature of nursing is that if you do something wrong, you are 
blamed. ‘Why did you do that? You should have taken an escort, and the 
patient ran off’, and this and that. Obviously, the pressure comes from up 
top. The pressure comes from them in the community, the politicians, 
maybe the Home Office. There is a lot of pressure that filters right down 
… it is against taking any risks, but that stifles the whole nursing thing of 
using your initiative, trying new ways and all that. (Kunle, CASU charge 
nurse, phase one interview) 
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Nurses were particularly exposed to the risk of blame on account of their 
generic role in sustaining the rehabilitative risk escalator. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present study was undertaken in one RSU, with its own specific 
characteristics, particularly an ethnically diverse, socioeconomically deprived 
cachement area, financial instability and organisational turmoil. The findings 
of a case study can only be generalised in relation to its particular attributes. 
However, the emergent issues closely resembled those found in a study of a 
medium/low secure institution located in Northern England. The latter unit 
differed from the present research site in many respects, including a client 
group with learning disabilities, rural location, the mono-ethnicity of its staff 
and patients, and a low staff turnover in an area of relatively high 
unemployment and stable population. The two units also differed in their 
organisational history. Researcher questions to senior staff about who had 
designed the North of England institution generated wry amusement. Its sub-
units had evolved independently to offer different balances of safety versus 
autonomy, and had subsequently been coalesced into one risk management 
system. The London RSU, in contrast, had been consciously designed by a 
senior psychiatrist to provide a progressive system of rehabilitation. However, 
its architecture had been frequently modified, for example to incorporate 
additional stages of rehabilitation, as noted above. 
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Interviews with participants offer only limited insights into underlying 
processes of risk management, accounts of which may be idealised or reflect 
disillusion, depending upon the stance of the staff or patient respondent. 
However, putting together multiple perspectives can, perhaps, generate an 
insightful picture of the overall risk management system. The crises and 
scandals which we were aware of in the London Unit did not surface in 
research interviews, a strong limitation of this data collection method. But 
more fundamental problems which we have interpreted in terms of the 
architecture of the risk escalator emerged clearly in both settings. 
 
Underlying the relative calm of the North of England institution and turmoil of 
the London RSU were similar issues arising from their operation as downward 
risk escalators, namely processing problems such as blocked chains of 
movement, difficulties for risk assessment and management arising from 
patients’ strategic attempts to control their risk status, and reliance on the 
mostly unfulfilled accomplishment of multiprofessional and inter-organisational 
collaboration. The most noticeable outcome of these problems was 
disjunction between perceived risk status, however assessed, and location on 
the rehabilitative risk escalator, a disjunction which undermined its therapeutic 
legitimacy. 
 
Consideration of these organisational issues raises the question of the 
implications for service development of research which has explored 
processes of risk management in RSUs. The National Service Framework for 
Mental Health (1999) recommended increased provision for mentally 
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disordered offenders at all levels of security. Although the problems identified 
in the present research appear rather intractable, the outcomes can hardly be 
worse than those of the prison system for this client group. Moreover, follow-
up research with ex-patients from the Northern England service (Heyman, 
Griffiths and Taylor, 2004) suggests that the frustrations, delays and setbacks 
associated with the in-patient experience may be viewed more positively in 
retrospect, even by patients whose re-entry into the community had failed.  
 
Reflection on an overall health system can identify areas where critical 
attention might enhance risk management. For example, the interconnected 
nature of patient movements leads to blockages if any link in the chain is 
broken, just as in the UK housing market. One way of reducing the number 
and length of chain blockages would be to fund spare capacity in RSUs.  
 
Although the present paper has adopted a resolutely organisational approach, 
the resonances between the withholding of progress and patients’ personal 
biographies, which often include abuse (Coid, 1992) as well as offending, 
should not be overlooked. Patients whose ability to form and sustain 
attachments has been disrupted by traumatic childhood experiences are 
expected to manage separation from external personal support networks, if 
any, frequent terminations of relationships with patient peers and staff. They 
are required to relate to a transient and disturbed peer group and to staff 
whose limited engagement with them is a form of work (Adshead, 2002). The 
RSU needs to be considered as the community in which patients spend a 
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significant portion of their lives. As in any human community, members’ 
quality of life will depend upon the supportiveness of their social networks. 
 
A third issue worthy of developmental consideration concerns the tension 
between individual risk assessment and care for patients in groups. For 
example, patients might be ‘promoted’ simply to separate them from others 
even though they had not earned a reduction in their risk status. The tension 
between care for patients in groups and the ascription of risk status to 
individuals requires critical consideration. 
 
Fourthly, the paradox of risk assessment in secure settings needs to be 
critically addressed. By preventing offending behaviour, RSUs make its 
assessment more problematic. Actuarial methods cannot offer a reliable guide 
to the safety of the rehabilitation of individual offenders who by definition will 
exhibit high risk factors. The present research suggests that risk managers 
may in practice assess risk in terms of compliance, or test behaviour in 
conditions of presumed greater ecological validity, for example when a patient 
is on parole. They may add further stages to the risk escalator in order to 
postpone difficult decisions. Although demonstrably irrational in their own 
terms, such manoeuvres may be adopted faut de mieux.  
 
Finally, the effectiveness of the RSU as an instrument of rehabilitation was 
predicated on the assumption of multiprofessional collaboration. Such 
collaboration cannot be taken for granted, but needs to be organisationally 
striven for. In particular, nursing occupies a central but difficult strategic 
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position with respect to offering a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to 
rehabilitation. Frontline nurses provide most everyday care, and have a 
potentially holistic view of patients unavailable to the other specialised 
professions. But lack a clearly defined rehabilitative role, at least in the minds 
of other professionals. Unless the involved professions respect and 
understand the roles of the others, risk escalators cannot work effectively. The 
difficulty of achieving such collaboration should not be underestimated.  
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